Framing Income Inequality in the Media: Is There a Liberal or Neoliberal Bias? by Byrne, Rebecca Jolene
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of 
Spring 2012 
Framing Income Inequality in the Media: Is There a 
Liberal or Neoliberal Bias? 
Rebecca Jolene Byrne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Byrne, Rebecca Jolene, "Framing Income Inequality in the Media: Is There a Liberal or 
Neoliberal Bias?" (2012). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 622. 
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/622 
This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, Jack 
N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia 
Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
	   	   	  
FRAMING INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE MEDIA: IS THERE  
A LIBERAL OR NEOLIBERAL BIAS? 
 
by 
 
REBECCA JOLENE BYRNE  
 
 
(Under the Direction of Ted Brimeyer) 
ABSTRACT 
This study is a quantitative content analysis that analyzes how The New York 
Times framed income inequality between 2006 and 2010. A thorough review of the 
literature regarding rising income inequality in the United States, media theory, framing, 
bias, cultural hegemony, liberal and neoliberal political trends, and social mobility 
precedes findings that media coverage of income inequality declined while inequality 
grew. Various neoliberal, liberal, and neutral frames are identified and examined for slant 
and bias. I find that while the Times has a slight liberal bias in framing income inequality, 
a neoliberal hegemonic discourse pervades how the issue is addressed. Finally, I address 
the significance of social mobility as an absent frame in the media’s discourse on income 
inequality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 	  
 
On September 17, 2011 hundreds of people gathered in New York City to protest 
the unprecedented level of income inequality in the United States (The New York Times, 
2012). Months of ongoing protests in dozens of cities across America followed. This 
movement, called Occupy Wall Street, has been calling attention to the incredible income 
disparity between the very wealthiest and the rest of Americans with the meme “we are 
the 99 percent.” As of 2009, the wealthiest 1% of U.S. households had net worth that was 
225 times greater than the median or typical household’s net worth in 2009 (EPI Briefing 
Paper, 2011). This is the highest ratio on record. Between 1979 and 2007, average after 
tax incomes for the top 1% rose by 281 percent, while rising only 25% for the middle 
fifth and merely 16% for the bottom fifth (CBPP Report, 2010, p. 165). From 1983 to 
2009, the share of wealth for the bottom 80% of wealth holders declined from 18.7% to 
just 12.8%, meaning that the top 20% of wealth holders in the United States own 87.2% 
of America’s wealth (EPI Briefing Paper, 2011). According to the Congressional Budget 
Office, the median annual income for men working full-time in 2009 was about $37,000, 
while workers in the 10th percentile earned just $17,800, and those in the 90th percentile 
earned $86,000 annually (CBO Study, 2011).  
As the literature review that follows shows, despite recent protest movements, 
many Americans are unaware of the rise in income inequality over the last few decades 
(McCall, 2005). Popular explanations for income inequality emphasize either individual 
or structural explanations (Feagin, 1975; K. B. Smith & Stone, 1989). The media play an 
important role in drawing attention to social issues such as inequality. Through framing 
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and agenda setting, the media engages in both sensemaking and sensegiving by including, 
omitting, organizing, and interpreting information (Entman, 1993; Gamson, Croteau, 
Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The amount of news exposure a 
particular issue receives has a strong impact on what individuals believe are the most 
important social and political issues (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990; Erbring, Goldenbert, 
& Miller, 1980; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974; Shaw & 
McCombs, 1997).  And while the media does not tell individuals what to think, it does 
influence what they think about (Anastasio, Rose, & Chapnam, 1999; Entman, 1989). 
Thus, it is important, not only to identify the way news media frame important issues, but 
to evaluate the objectivity or bias of media representations of social issues (Entman, 
2007).  
Media framing of income inequality is particularly important because of the 
ambivalence most American’s have about the causes and remedies for income inequality 
(Kluegel, Csepeli, Kolosi, Orkeny, & Nemenyi, 1995). Media theories often focus on the 
role that elites, including journalists, play in promoting cultural hegemony by privileging 
the interests of elites over those of the middle and working class (Gitlin, 1980; Gramsci, 
1971; Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1984). Politically, the shift from liberal toward neoliberal 
political ideology in the United States emphasizes individual explanations for inequality 
rather than structural explanations, something often reflected in media framing of the 
issue (de Goede, 1996; Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2002).   
This study utilizes quantitative content analysis to evaluate how the media has 
framed income inequality between 2006 and 2010. First, I evaluate if the coverage the 
media has given to income inequality reflects the actual increase of inequality during 
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these years. Then I identify the various neoliberal, liberal, and neutral frames included in 
how the causes of and solutions for income inequality are represented. Next, I evaluate 
the articles for patterns of slant that might reveal a neoliberal or liberal bias. Finally, I 
address issues of cultural hegemony and the significance of social mobility as an absent 
frame in the media’s discourse on income inequality.
	  	  
	  
14	  
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE ON INCOME INEQUALITY 	  
Inequality on the Rise 
 
Income inequality has long been a social problem in the United States. The 
income gap has continued to grow rapidly since the 1970’s. Between 1979 and 2007, 
average after tax incomes for the top 1% rose by 281 percent, while rising only 25% for 
the middle fifth and merely 16% for the bottom fifth (CBPP Report, 2010, p. 165). 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the median annual income for men 
working full-time in 2009 was about $37,000, while workers in the 10th percentile earned 
just $17,800, and those in the 90th percentile earned $86,000 annually (CBO Study, 2011). 
Perhaps as concerning as the gap in earned income, the gap in wealth continues to grow 
as well. In 2009, the wealthiest one percent of U.S. households had a net worth that was 
225 times greater than the typical household’s net worth (EPI Briefing Paper, 2011). And 
in spite of the recession from 2007 to 2009, the gap in wealth has not significantly 
narrowed, in part because while the richest fifth of Americans saw average annual 
declines in wealth of 16%, the rest of Americans saw average declines of 25% (EPI 
Briefing Paper, 2011). According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2010), 
there is a greater income concentration at the top of the income scale than at any time 
since 1928. And those who are at the top are likely to stay there, while those who are 
born to low-income families have a one percent chance of getting rich (Hertz, 2006). The 
United States has, not only one of the highest rates of income inequality in the developed 
world, but one of the lowest rates of intergenerational mobility (Garfinkel, Rainwater, & 
Smeeding, 2010; Hertz, 2006; Solon, 2002). 
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American’s Attitudes Toward Inequality 
 
 A sparse but growing body of literature seeks to determine the degree to which 
the American public is aware of the rise in income inequality, as well as their attitudes 
toward it. McCall (2005) suggests that there are three reasons Americans may not be 
fully aware of, or concerned about, the growing income gap in the United States. First, 
Americans experience what McCall terms “normative ambiguity,” meaning conflicting 
beliefs surrounding the fairness of income distribution, the role of inequality in 
motivating individuals to succeed, and society’s obligation to redistribute wealth.  
Americans generally believe that income inequality motivates people to succeed, 
creating greater wealth and productivity, despite evidence to the contrary (Garfinkel, et 
al., 2010; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Osberg, Smeeding, & Schwabish, 2004). However, 
while some level of inequality is considered acceptable, this belief coincides with a - 
sometimes contradictory - desire for equity (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Emphasis on the 
importance of personal responsibility and meritocracy lead most Americans to embrace 
norms of differentiation in the economic realm, even though they express support for 
norms of egalitarianism in the social and political realms (Hochschild, 1981).  
Second, income inequality is a highly abstract concept with vague and shifting 
definitions (McCall, 2005). Who, exactly, falls into the “middle class” in comparison to 
the “wealthy” and “poor?” Third, the link between redistributive government policies and 
reducing inequality is tenuous in the minds of many, leading to confusion and apathy 
regarding the causes, consequences, and remedies for inequality (McCall, 2005). For 
example, Kluegel et al. (1995) find that individuals are likely to support both egalitarian 
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positions such as redistribution according to need and inegalitarian positions that blame 
the poor for their plight simultaneously.      
 In general, Americans have a higher tolerance for income inequality than the 
people of other wealthy nations (Garfinkel, et al., 2010; McCall, 2005; Osberg & 
Smeeding, 2006; Xu & Carand, 2010). Scholars have also found that Americans’ 
awareness of inequality does not parallel empirical trends (McCall, 2005; Xu & Carand, 
2010). Individuals who live in states with higher levels of inequality are more aware of 
national inequality, but this primarily applies to those with lower incomes (Xu & Carand, 
2010). Wealthy individuals (those in the top quintile and top decile) are less likely to be 
aware of rising inequality, and they are less likely to perceive it as a problem (McCall, 
2005; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Xu & Carand, 2010). Ironically, Americans are less 
aware of the extent of inequality at the top of the income distribution (Osberg & 
Smeeding, 2006). Additionally, political knowledge does not automatically translate into 
grater awareness of the large increase in income inequality (Xu & Carand, 2010). While 
there is a trend over time toward greater tolerance of inequality in the distribution of 
earnings, there is also a growing polarization between those who find income inequality 
acceptable and those who do not (McCall, 2005; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). McCall 
(2005) found that Democrats and liberals were significantly more likely to object to 
current levels of inequality compared to Republicans and conservatives.  
 The single biggest predictor of individual opposition to inequality is perception of 
chances for mobility (McCall, 2005). Those who feel their standard of living is likely to 
improve are significantly more tolerant of inequality than those who do not. Significantly, 
despite the fact that America has one of the most static rates of mobility compared to 
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other wealthy nations, only a small minority of Americans are aware of this fact (Hertz, 
2006; McCall, 2005; Solon, 2002). 
American’s Attitudes Toward Poverty and Wealth 
 
Individuals’ beliefs about the causes for wealth and poverty are closely related to 
their attitudes toward income inequality. Popular explanations for poverty typically place 
responsibility either on the individual, on the structure of society, or on fatalistic and 
divine forces (Brimeyer, 2008; Feagin, 1975). One popular, and powerful, explanation for 
poverty is embodied in the “perversity thesis” (Somers & Block, 2005). This concept 
shifts the blame for poverty from structural conditions to individual failure. Such 
individual explanations for poverty have been linked to political conservatism (Wagstaff, 
1983; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) and are more likely to be held by whites, members of the 
middle-class, and conservative Protestants (Bullock, 1999; Hunt, 2004; Zucker & Weiner, 
1993). Structural explanations for poverty and inequality are more likely to be held by 
minorities, women, mainline Protestants and Catholics, and members of lower social 
classes (Bobo, 1991; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). However, it is worth noting that structural 
explanations for poverty frequently coexist with individual explanations (Hochschild, 
1995; Hunt, 2004; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). 
Similarly, people tend to explain wealth as having been acquired through 
individual merit rather than through structural factors (K. B. Smith & Stone, 1989). 
Family inheritance, social advantages, and elite educational opportunities are not as 
frequently cited when explaining wealth as are talent and hard work (Kluegel & Smith, 
1986; K. B. Smith & Stone, 1989). Such individual attributions for wealth make it more 
likely that people will support government policies that benefit the wealthy, even if such 
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policies do not benefit themselves (Bullock & Fernald, 2005; Gilens, 1999; Limbert & 
Bullock, 2009). The emphasis on individual rather than structural causes for inequality is 
one of the reasons many Americans believe that some level of inequality is fair, although 
people frequently underestimate the extent of income inequality in the United States 
(McCall, 2005; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006). 
Income Inequality in the Media  
 
Champlin and Knoedler (2008) note that media coverage of income inequality has 
frequently been inadequate, either ignoring causal interpretations and solutions, or 
pointing to the seemingly inevitable and uncontrollable forces of globalization and rapid 
technological change. They identify three general themes cited by the news media 
regarding the declining fortunes of the middle class, including: the failure of the poor and 
middle class to adapt to impersonal economic trends, bad government and trade policy 
exacerbate these economic trends, and tax policies have favored the rich at the expense of 
the middle class and the poor (Champlin & Knoedler, 2008). They conclude that the 
media chooses to frame the discussion of income inequality and the economic plight of 
the middle class in such a way as to avoid analyzing the long-term implications of the 
current economic system or to consider possible solutions to the problem.  
In a content analysis of newspaper representations of welfare reform and dividend 
tax cuts, Limbert and Bullock (2009) suggest “references to ‘seniors’ and ‘welfare 
recipients’ acted as code words, with the former eliciting favorable associations (i.e., 
White, middle class, honest, hard worker) and the latter activating devalued social 
identities (i.e., African American, poor, single mother, lazy). Thus, social-economic 
policies were framed in a way that suggested tax cuts would go to the deserving while 
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welfare was being distributed to the undeserving poor. The way these two issues were 
framed encouraged support for tax cuts that benefited elites while diminishing support for 
progressive welfare policies that benefited the poor.  
In a study examining the effects of framing on individuals’ attitudes toward 
eliminating the dividend tax, participants were less supportive of eliminating the dividend 
tax when it was framed as benefiting the wealthy, but more supportive when the tax cut 
was framed as benefiting the general public (Bullock & Fernald, 2005). However, pre-
existing attitudes toward the rich had a significant mediating effect on framing effects. 
In examining media framing of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, Bell and Entman 
(2011) found that tax cuts benefiting the wealthy were framed by the media as benefiting 
all Americans, despite the reality that they overwhelmingly benefited the wealthy. The 
study also found that the majority of news stories were strongly slanted toward favoring 
the tax cuts, creating a bias that lent credibility to claims that the tax cuts were necessary 
while discrediting or silencing dissenting opinions. Finally, issues of equality and 
inequality were simply left out of the frame all together. 
While the episodic nature of news reporting might lead us to expect a strong 
emphasis on individual causes and solutions to social problems, a recent content analysis 
of media representation of poverty found that the media tends to emphasize social rather 
than individual solutions, perhaps because of journalists’ personal political views or 
because of external events relating to the timing of coverage (Kim, Carvalho, & Davis, 
2010). 
Finally, to evaluate whether the media has given sufficient attention to growing 
income inequality, McCall (2005) examined the frequency of articles in three 
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newsweeklies that addressed the subject between 1980 and 2000. She found that media 
coverage did not reflect objective trends in inequality over that time period.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY 	  
Framing, Agenda Setting, and Sensemaking 
 
Connecting the public’s attitudes toward income inequality with media framing 
effects, Kluegel, et al., believe that the ambivalence created by American’s conflicting 
attitudes toward the government’s role in remedying income inequality “presents a fertile 
ground for framing effects as political actors compete to make salient either the social 
explanations of poverty and wealth in support of redistribution or the individual 
explanations to motivate opposition to the welfare state” (1995, p. 206).  
Framing is the process by which actors “select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Framing allows 
communicators and audiences to use a common vocabulary to understand and interpret 
complex issues. However, it is important to note that framing is not a natural or neutral 
process, but is the result of specific decisions on the part of an actor as to how an issue 
should be addressed, and what should be included or omitted within the discussion (for 
an example of how this process might occur, see Lester, 1980).   
Another way to understand framing is to see it as "the construction of an agenda 
with a restricted number of thematically related attributes in order to create a coherent 
picture of a particular object" (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p. 70).  Issue salience is the 
relative perceived importance of a problem; framing affects the salience of the issue and 
its various elements (Entman, 1993; Erbring, et al., 1980). Agenda setting is the process 
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by which journalists select and highlight certain issues while ignoring others (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972). Framing and agenda setting have been linked, because both have a 
powerful effect on the salience of issues and their attributes (McCombs & Ghanem, 
2001). 
Because sensemaking is a way of organizing information about the world by 
using schemas and interpreting salient information, researchers are beginning to see 
framing and sensemaking as similar processes that provide a means to organize ideas and 
events in an understandable way (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Gamson, et al., 1992). However, 
the power of media framing lies in that, not only is it a process of sensemaking, it is also 
a process of sensegiving (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Framing 
allows specific aspects of an issue to be highlighted, while downplaying or omitting 
others. In this way, the media has the power to influence what individuals think, 
including their political and social opinions, by affecting what exactly they think about 
(Entman, 1989).  
Peet (2002) suggests that Gramsci’s (1971) notion of cultural hegemony (see 
discussion below) as the prevailing commonsense beliefs of a culture that shape the 
collective consciousness can be applied to understanding the influential power of the 
media. Peet’s explanation below is strongly reminiscent of the agenda setting and 
framing theories: 
The hegemonic depth of a discourse—its intensive regulatory 
power—resides in its ability to restrict serious, “responsible” consideration 
to a limited range of topics and approaches or, more generally, an 
ability to specify the parameters of the practical, realistic, and sensible 
among linked groups of theoreticians, policy-makers, and practitioners. (p. 57) 
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Bias in Media Framing 
 
Because language is inherently evaluative in nature, some believe that bias in the 
media is unavoidable (Geis, 1991). Since researchers have found that the media “subtly 
but powerfully create the very opinions they seek to reflect” (Anastasio, et al., 1999, p. 
152), it is important for social scientists to identify and make known any bias or slant 
found when the media frame social issues. Some scholars suggest that journalists’ 
personal political tendencies, which tend to be liberal, bias their reporting (Goldberg, 
2002), although others have found that journalists tend to be more conservative on 
economic issues than the general public, leading them to be more supportive of neoliberal 
ideology that benefits elites (Croteau, 1998; de Goede, 1996; Kollmeyer, 2004). Much 
scholarship has focused on the effects of the media’s reliance on funding from advertisers 
and the consolidation of corporate interests, finding that news reporting tends to be 
distorted by capitalist and conservative interests (Bennett, 1990; Champlin & Knoedler, 
2002, 2008; Entman, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 1988).  For example, content analysis 
of economic reporting has revealed that the news media privilege the interests of 
corporations and investors over the interests of the general work force in their reporting 
(Kollmeyer, 2004). 
Finally, some maintain that the media is generally neutral in its reporting. In 
analyzing newspaper coverage of political party switchers, Niven (2003) examined the 
relative frequency of positive, negative, and neutral statements made regarding each 
candidate in search of bias, and found little bias for or against either party. Fogarty 
(2005) suggests that while the media is not objective when reporting economic news, 
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journalists focus on negative news regardless of which political party this might aid or 
disadvantage. 
When framing the issue of poverty, conservative papers placed more emphasis on 
individual causes and solutions than did liberal papers (Kim, et al., 2010). This is in line 
with a study conducted by Covert and Wasburn (2007) that analyzed the bias of 
mainstream, conservative, and liberal magazine’s coverage of social issues. They found 
that the political bias of conservative and liberal magazines was reflected in the framing 
of social issues, while framing of these issues in mainstream magazines was more 
balanced. 
To connect the concepts of framing and agenda setting with bias, Entman 
proposes using the term slant (2007). Slant is used in reference to specific media reports 
and editorials “in which framing favors on side over the other in a current or potential 
debate,” whereas bias takes the form of “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated 
communication that promote the influence of one side in conflicts over the use of 
government power” (Entman, 2007, pp. 165, 166). In short, slant refers to privileging one 
frame over another within a specific unit, such as an article, while bias refers to a pattern 
of slant within many articles over time. Entman cautions against simply counting each 
instance of support or opposition for a particular government action when measuring 
slant, because priming effects exert different weight for different positions. 
Media Theory and Cultural Hegemony 
 
In evaluating sociological theories regarding the media, Shoemaker and Mayfield 
(1984) identify five theoretical approaches: (1) the mirror approach, (2) routines of 
newsgathering, (3) journalist-centered approach, (4) social/institutional influence, and (5) 
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the hegemonic approach. The mirror approach suggests that the news media accurately 
reports on, and is thus a reflection of, reality. Shoemaker and Mayfield (1984) found little 
support for this theory, as have others since in areas ranging from the challenges facing 
working women in need of child care, reports of the avian flu epidemic, and economic 
news coverage (Abeysinghe & White, 2010; Albanese, et al., 2010; Fogarty, 2005). 
The routines of newsgathering, the journalist-centered approach, and the 
social/institutional influence theories can all be combined under the hegemonic approach 
(Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1984). First conceived of by Antonio Gramsci, hegemony is 
part of the two major superstructural levels that serve to impose the ideology of the elite 
on the “great masses of the population” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). In contrast to direct 
domination, which is a function of the State, hegemony is a function of the major 
institutions of civil society; it creates “spontaneous” consent to the structural inequalities 
within society through the penetration of elite ideology into the common sense and 
everyday practices of subordinate classes (Gitlin, 1980; Gramsci, 1971; Shoemaker & 
Mayfield, 1984). It is the very subtle but ubiquitous nature of hegemony that makes it so 
powerful in promoting the ideas and cultural norms supportive of the existing 
socioeconomic order.  
Extending the concept of hegemony to the role of the media, scholars have found 
that the media serves to promote the interests of economic and political elites under the 
guise of objectivity, while deliberately conflating the interests of the elites with those of 
workers and others outside the elite class (Bell & Entman, 2011; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 
1980; Habermas, 1991; Kollmeyer, 2004). In this way, the media acts as propaganda that 
manufactures consent for the current economic system (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; 
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Parenti, 1993). Just as Gramsci (1971, p. 12) defines the role of intellectuals in society as 
the dominant group’s “deputies” that promote ideas and cultural norms supportive of elite 
interests, the media acts as a deputy that frames and disseminates these ideas and norms.  
In reviewing the following theories regarding the news media, it is easy to see how each 
one emphasizes the power of elites to portray economic and social issues in ways that 
ideologically justify the current economic system, falling under the overarching 
theoretical umbrella of cultural hegemony.             
The routine of newsgathering approach analyzes the way news is gathered and the 
professional norms that dictate what constitutes news and how it is to be reported (Breed, 
1955; Clayman & Reisner, 1998; Tuchman, 1978; White, 1950). The routines news 
workers use to identify the newsworthy character of occurrences and events rely on the 
ongoing and reflexive processes that take place as reporters and editors determine how a 
story will be framed (Lester, 1980).  Researchers have found that journalists rely heavily 
on information from elite economic, government, and political sources in their reporting, 
while consulting labor unions and civic organizations less frequently (Croteau & Hoynes, 
2001; William & Singletary, 1981). While some believe that the professional norms of 
newsgathering are designed to ensure objectivity, others have argued that these norms act 
to constrain journalists from expressing views counter to the interests of corporate and 
political elites (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Reese, 1990).   
The journalist-centered approach suggests that the personal biases of journalists 
influence media representation of social and economic issues. Initially, research in this 
area focused on the idea that journalists as a whole tend to have liberal political views, 
which in turn lead them to framing issues with a left-leaning bias (Goldberg, 2002; 
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Rothman & Lichter, 1982). However, a 1998 (Croteau) analysis of survey data revealed 
that while journalists tend to be liberal on social issues, they are more conservative than 
the general public on economic issues. Herman and Chomsky (1988) state that many 
reporters internalize elite corporate and government interests and values as they are 
rewarded with success for expressing these views – and labeled as ideological or aberrant 
when they do not.  
Discounting the idea that journalists are likely to promote a liberal agenda, 
scholars have suggested that journalists themselves are part of the “power elite,” a ruling 
class of individuals with shared economic interests which shape their cultural and 
political views (Kollmeyer, 2004; Mills, 1956). In support of this position, Champlin and 
Knoedler (2008) reference a survey that found half the journalists polled had incomes 
exceeding $100,000. These journalists also viewed economic conditions to be more 
favorable than did the general public (Champlin & Knoedler, 2008; Croteau, 1998). As 
part of the power elite, journalists would be inclined to justify the current economic 
system and resulting income inequality (Kollmeyer, 2004). 
The social/institutional influence theories focus on factors other than individual 
journalistic bias, such as the economic reliance of the media on advertising revenue and 
the ownership structure of the media (Gitlin, 1980; Kollmeyer, 2004; Shoemaker & 
Mayfield, 1984). Advertisers have the power to influence media content, either by 
requiring media outlets to write editorial copy that they find supportive, or by refusing to 
advertise in media outlets that express views counter to their interests (Champlin & 
Knoedler, 2002).  
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Considerable criticism has followed the growing monopolization of all forms of 
media into media giants. As of 1990, only twenty-three corporations controlled most of 
the business in the news media, a significant decline from forty-six corporations in 1983 
(Bagdikian, 1990). Of those outlets, the vast majority of the news media market is 
controlled by “The Big Six,” including AOL-Time Warner, Disney, Viacom, NewsCorp, 
Bertelsmann, and General Electric [Comcast]; this means that control over access to the 
“critical pipelines of information” is more centralized than ever (Champlin & Knoedler, 
2002, p. 461). As media becomes more monopolized by a small group of powerful 
companies, the news becomes more about “info-tainment” and self-promotion (or self-
protection) than about serving the public interests (Champlin & Knoedler, 2002). 
Arguing that as corporations control greater and greater shares of the media industry with 
less and less competition, Champlin and Knoedler (2008) assert that news media 
coverage is determined by profit motive rather than public interest. This position is in line 
with Bagdikian’s (1990) assertion that the news media is under pressure to produce the 
same rates of profits that the other entertainment divisions of their umbrella corporations 
do. Additionally, the consolidation of multiple media outlets under one corporation 
ensures a captive audience and reinforces the hegemonic power of the elites (Bagdikian, 
1990; Gamson, et al., 1992). 
Competing Political Hegemonic Discourses 
 
It is important to note that many scholars question the existence of one single 
hegemony (Gamson, et al., 1992). Instead, they suggest that alternative and oppositional 
hegemonic discourses compete for dominance in society (Williams, 1977). Kellner 
(1990) states that different classes and social groups are engaged in a struggle to impose 
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their visions, interests, and agendas on society as a whole. Thus, multiple hegemonic 
forces can be in contest with one another at any given time. This more flexible view of 
hegemony deviates from Gramsci’s basic premise that cultural hegemony serves to 
justify economic systems that promote elite interests, but it offers a point of entry for 
understanding how multiple ideologies can coexist within a society.  
In examining hegemonic beliefs regarding income inequality, it is necessary to 
examine the shift in political ideology from liberal Keynesian to neoliberal economic 
practices. Demand-side economics, rooted in Keynes Law that “demand creates its own 
supply,” became the primary political-economic approach in the United States following 
the first World War (Garfinkel, et al., 2010; Keynes, 1958). Keynesian economic 
ideology emphasizes the importance of a mixed economy in which government actively 
promotes employment, regulates industry, invests in infrastructure, and provides social 
services. Liberal, (politically left-leaning) ideology embraces Keynesian economics as a 
part of the promotion of the welfare state1 (Garfinkel, et al., 2010; Huber & Stephens, 
2001). Defined as “a unique blend of capitalism and socialism,” welfare states extend the 
metaphor of family transfers of wealth from the able to the needy to encompass collective 
transfers of wealth within a society (Garfinkel, et al., 2010, p. 2). The benefits of the 
welfare state “exceed costs, which is the primary reason why all rich nations have large 
welfare states” (Garfinkel, et al., 2010, p. 3). Garfinkel, et al (2010) make the argument 
that while too much socialism within a mixed-economy will disincentivize work and slow 
growth, over reliance on the free market to determine economic outcomes will inevitably 
result in some individuals suffering from the resulting “creative distruction” (Schumpter, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is a mark of how powerful the neoliberal hegemony is that even mentioning the 
“welfare state” brings to mind a number of negative images and connotations. 
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1942). They note that social safety nets increase the fairness of the system and quell 
discontent, leading to stability and growth . In addition, welfare states reduce the 
economic insecurity inherent in capitalism, leading individuals to take more economic 
and entrepreneural risks. Finally, investments in public education, as a part of welfare 
state redistribution policies, have been widely recognized to promote economic growth 
(Barro, 2001). 
In elaborating the underlying moral justification for liberal political-economic 
philosophy as embodied by the social democratic welfare state, Walzer (2010) 
emphasizes the abolition of poverty, rather than merely providing relief, as the objective. 
Unlike Marxism, the welfare state seeks to promote equality through redistribution 
without revolution. Due to the modern characteristics of society, such as the mobility of 
populations, the isolation of the poor from the view of others into segregated urban 
ghettos or isolated rural communities, and the large scale in which public relief is needed, 
the state is far better equipped to provide public relief than charity. And, while charity 
turns the poor into “permanent supplicants of well-to-do patrons,” simultaneously 
demeaning the poor and creating dependence, state supported job training, schooling, and 
day care serve as a means of empowering the poor while fostering independence (Walzer, 
2010, p. 289). While the state is the necessary agent of self-help in the achievement of 
poverty relief, democracy is vital to protecting the interests of the people from excessive 
or abusive state authority.  
Since the 1970s, neoliberal political-economic ideology and practices have 
dominated policy in the United States (Harvey, 2005). Based upon the belief that 
deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, and ending social welfare programs are 
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key to maximizing market efficiency, neoliberalism is rooted in the idea that human well-
being is dependent upon capitalism as a means to create wealth and prosperity. Classical 
liberal thinkers promoted a hierarchy of means for the alleviation of poverty, placing 
personal responsibility and self-help at the top, followed by “mutual aid” to one another, 
followed by charity, and positioning redistribution policies at the bottom as a last resort 
(Palmer, 2010). Although welfare state intervention was strongly frowned upon and 
criticized as a form of state compulsion, classical liberals did allow for the state provision 
to the poor and indigent.   
Milton Friedman, for example, advocated state compulsion in forcing individuals 
to buy annuities as a way to provide for their own old age, justifying it on the grounds 
that otherwise the elderly would become a burden to society (Friedman, 1962, p. 188). 
Friedman also recognized the limits of charity in providing relief to the poor, suggesting 
that society as a whole benefits from not being “distressed by the sight of poverty,” while 
only those who give charity pay the costs (p. 191). Since alleviating poverty is classified 
as a public good, Friedman found it acceptable for the state to use legal compulsion to 
force taxpayers to support those in need (Palmer, 2010). Hayek, too, recognized that 
“there are common needs that can be satisfied only by collective action,” including 
providing for health, education, and aid to the indigent, unfortunate, and disabled (Hayek, 
1960; Palmer, 2010).  
However, the primary focus of classical liberalism (and neoliberalism) is not 
reducing inequality or alleviating poverty, but creating wealth. Conflating the concept of 
“freedom” with the concept of “economic freedom” and rooted in Say’s Law that “supply 
creates its own demand,” the rhetoric of supply-side economics turns capitalism into a 
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moral imperative (Friedman, 1962; Harvey, 2005). The morality of supply-side 
economics has been framed in multiple ways, from Adam Smith’s (1937) position that 
pursuing individual self-interest inevitably leads to promoting the interests of society to 
Hayek’s (1976) argument that capitalism is the only moral political-economic system 
because all other systems are coercive. Gilder (1981) went so far as to suggest that the 
morality of supply-side economics rests in the altruism of entrepreneurial activity. In his 
argument, investors are giving a “gift,” since there is no guarantee of a return.  
Neoliberal political thought is rooted in classical liberalism, but with an even 
more adamant insistence on deregulation and privatization of previously state-run 
enterprises (Harvey, 2005). The neoliberal insistence on governance based on market 
criteria has lead to the devaluation of political liberty, equality, substantive citizenship, 
and the rule of law (Brown, 2006). Beginning in the 1980’s protecting the poor from 
being pushed into dependency became the neoliberal moral justification for ending social 
services (de Goede, 1996). While classical liberal philosophy allowed for limited state 
intervention in providing a social safety net, or “a floor under the standard of life of every 
person in the community” (Friedman, 1962, p. 191), neoliberal thought has sought to 
demonize the welfare state and the poor who benefit from it (de Goede, 1996; Peet, 2002).     
Neoliberalism characterizes individual success or failure as a result of virtuous 
entrepreneurial effort or personal failings, denying any social or structural influence on 
outcomes (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the wealthy are viewed as virtuous and deserving while 
the poor are morally suspect at best. “The Law of Unintended Consequences,” or the 
belief that welfare created an incentive for the poor to avoid work in order to receive 
government support, become one of the most influential arguments of neoliberal scholars 
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(de Goede, 1996; Gilder, 1981; Murray, 1984). This ideological position has had a lasting 
impact on American social policy, starting with Regan’s attack on poor women, who 
characterized them as “welfare queens,” and continuing into the welfare cutbacks of the 
Clinton era (de Goede, 1996; Garfinkel, et al., 2010; Harvey, 2005; Limbert & Bullock, 
2009).  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHOD 	  
Research Questions 
 
Q1: Does coverage given to income inequality in The New York Times from 2006 – 2010 
reflect the empirical rise in inequality during the same time period, as measured by the 
number of articles that address the topic? 
Q2: How does the media define “income inequality”?  
A. Does the framing of income inequality include salient information about 
the growing gap between the wealthy and the middle class and poor?  
B. Does the frame include relevant information about the lack of 
socioeconomic mobility for Americans during the five year period 
examined? 
Q3: How does The New York Times frame the causes of income inequality? 
Q4: What solutions are included in the framing of income inequality? 
Q5: Is there evidence for a liberal or neoliberal hegemony in how income inequality is 
framed as measured by the ratio of liberal to neoliberal causes and solutions mentioned 
over the course of the five-year period? 
Q6: Is there evidence for a liberal or a neoliberal bias in The New York Times when 
addressing the issue of income inequality as measured by the frequency each article is 
slanted toward a liberal, neoliberal, or neutral position? 
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Sample 
 
 To answer the research questions, I identified all articles in The New York Times 
that contained the words “income” and “inequality” through a Lexis-Nexis Academic 
search.  I chose to analyze The New York Times because it is widely recognized as a 
paper of national prominence and wide circulation, and it is an agenda-setter for other 
newspapers (Blood & Phillips, 1995; Fogarty, 2005; 2006). Initially, 529 articles were 
identified. I removed duplicates, articles that addressed inequality in countries other than 
the Unite States, and articles that were not about income inequality. Because I wanted to 
analyze articles that reflected the views of the paper, editorials were included but letters 
to the editor were not (Albanese, et al., 2010; Muschert & Carr, 2006). This left 234 
articles to analyze. 
Coding 
 
 In line with Entman’s (1993) definition of framing, articles were examined to 
determine (1) the problem definition, (2) the causal interpretation, and/or (3) treatment 
recommendations. A literature review of articles related to media representations of 
poverty, income inequality, and wealth turned up several items that could initially be 
included in the codebook. A test run conducted with articles on income inequality in The 
Washington Post published during the same five-year period and The New York Times 
articles on income inequality published in years prior to the sample revealed several other 
items that were also included in the codebook. Each article was coded to determine if any 
of the problem definitions, causal interpretations, and treatment recommendations were 
mentioned in the article. Any references to the above were counted only once, no matter 
how many times they are mentioned in the article, to avoid inflating the number of 
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mentions overall. Table 1 provides detailed information on the specific causes and 
treatments included in the coding process. 
Articles were also analyzed for slant (Entman, 2007). For the purposes of coding, 
slant is defined as privileging one frame over another, either overtly or subtly by 
emphasizing the validity of one cause, moral assumption, or solution over another. 
Similar to the approach taken by other researchers who addressed slant or bias in media 
(Covert & Wasburn, 2007) I used “common sense” and hegemonic definitions of liberal 
and neoliberal that reflect how I believe the politically interested and astute might 
understand these terms relative to a specific space (the United States) and time (2006 -
2010). Because of the limitations inherent in relying on the number of times a frame is 
referenced or a source is cited (Covert & Wasburn, 2007; Entman, 2007), I took a holistic 
approach to determining if the article was slanted toward one frame or another. Table 2 
lists the specific definitions used when determining slant. 
Reliability 
 
A second coder analyzed 30 documents to ascertain reliability (Lacy & Riffe, 
1996). In order to establish inter-rater reliability, I calculated the percentage agreement 
for each frame (Neuendorf, 2002). Percentage agreement for definitions ranged from 80 
to 100 percent. Percentage agreement for causes and solutions ranged from 86.7% to 
100% and 86.7% to 100% respectively. Slant agreement ranged from 83.6% to 86.7%. A 
complete list of inter-rater reliability percentages can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 1. Casual Interpretation and Treatment Recommendation Frames 
Causal Interpretation 
Who/what is causing the problem? 
Treatment Recommendation 
How should the problem be solved? 
Individual Causes 
Lazy/lack motivation/lack talent/lack 
discipline, Lack education, Broken family, 
Disability, Make bad decisions, Drug 
abuse/criminal activity, Abuse/depend on 
social programs, Highly motivated/work hard, 
Exceptional talent, Make good decisions, 
Comes from a good family, Quality educational 
attainment 
Individual Solution 
Education attainment, Work harder, Get/stay 
married/family planning, Make better 
decisions, Individual philanthropy 
 
Societal Causes 
Culture of poverty, Discrimination/racism, 
Changing demographics of region/nation, 
Immigration, Changing societal norms 
(inequality more acceptable) 
Societal Solution 
Community action, Charity action 
 
Political Causes 
Taxes burden wealthy/business or unfairly 
benefit middle class/poor, Taxes burden middle 
class/poor or unfairly benefit wealthy/business, 
Welfare/social programs create dependency, 
Welfare/social programs are insufficient, 
Education policies, Political favors or 
advantages, Economic/business regulation - too 
much, Economic/business regulation - not 
enough, Health care policy inadequate, Right 
wing/elite conspiracy, Left wing 
conspiracy/class warfare 
Political Solution 
Tax cuts for the wealthy/business (or maintain 
cuts), Tax cuts for middle class/poor, 
progressive tax structure, increase for wealthy, 
Create more jobs, Reform government aid 
programs (more aid), Reform government aid 
programs (less aid/require more work), 
Privatize social security/reduce benefits/raise 
retirement age, Protect/expand social security, 
Raise minimum wage, Boost economy 
(general), Improve school quality, Improve 
access to higher education, Control 
outsourcing, globalization, etc, Protect 
union/worker rights, Regulate business 
practices, Health care reform 
Economic/Business Causes 
Globalization, Maximizing profits, General 
greed, Reckless behavior of business, Abusive 
behavior of business, Rise in unemployment, 
Slow job growth, Technology eliminating jobs, 
Unions demand too much, Unions declining in 
power, Stagnating wages, Inflation 
 
Economic/Businesses Solution 
Limit outsourcing, globalization, etc, Respect 
union/worker rights, Regulate practices  
 
Fatalistic Causes 
Luck, God’s will 
Problem can not be solved/ is inevitable 
Result of capitalism, Result of human 
nature/condition 
Cause is complex /too complex to explain Problem should not be solved/is not a 
problem 
Does not really exist, Is a good thing 
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Table 2. Definitions of Liberal and Neoliberal Bias 
Liberal causes: Structural, unequal 
opportunity, poor education opportunity, 
inheritance advantages, government 
deregulation of business, tax cuts for 
wealthy, declining power of unions, poor 
wages  
 
Neoliberal causes: Individual attainment, 
individual failure, market efficiency, too 
much government intervention   
 
Liberal solutions: restructure tax code, limit 
inheritance through taxes, increase minimum 
wages, increase business regulation, 
empower unions, improve education 
opportunities 
 
Neoliberal solutions: Government should 
stay out of business, trickle down 
economics, deregulate business, cut taxes for 
all, eliminate union control, improve 
education attainment  
 
Liberal moral assumptions: government 
should play a hand in eliminating inequality, 
capitalism should be moderated/regulated, 
not everyone has the same opportunities, 
extreme inequality is immoral, privileging 
equality 
 
Neoliberal assumptions: pursuit of 
happiness paramount, keeping what one 
earns is fair, welfare corrupts, unregulated 
markets are ideal, everyone in America has 
the same opportunities, privileging 
capitalism 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS 
 
Table 3 shows the total number of articles that included references to “income 
inequality” that were included in the framing analysis. Articles were coded primary if the 
focus was primarily on income inequality and secondary if the article addressed 
inequality as a significant cause or effect related to the main issue of the article. Articles 
were coded as tertiary if they only mentioned income inequality in passing, but were not 
about income inequality and did not address the issue fully.  
Figure 1 presents the total number of news stories that were coded as either 
primary or secondary. Figure 2 shows the income gap among men from 2005 – 2009, the 
years journalists would have likely been basing their current analysis of inequality on, 
while Figure 3 demonstrates the growing gap in wealth inequality between 1962 and 
2009. While both income inequality and wealth inequality grew, the number of articles 
addressing the issue significantly decreased from 2006 to 2009, with only a slight upturn 
during 2010. Clearly, in response to the first research question (Q1), newspaper coverage 
of income inequality between 2006 and 2010 does not correlate to the rise in inequality as 
measured by the number of articles that address the issue. 
 
Table 3. Focus of Articles  
Focus 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Primary 27 22 6 1 9 
Secondary 22 23 28 6 8 
Tertiary  23 18 17 9 15 
N 52 63 51 16 32 
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Figure 1. Income Inequality Coverage in The New York Times, 2006 – 2010 
Note: The number of articles coded as primary or secondary that addressed income inequality in The New York Times between 2006 
and 2010. Articles that included “income inequality” as key words but did not directly address income inequality in the United States 
are not included. 
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Figure 2. Hourly wages at selected percentiles for men, 2005 – 2009 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 2011 
(http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12051/02-16-WageDispersion.pdf) 
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Figure 3. Changes in the distribution of wealth, 1962 – 2009 
Source: Economic Policy Institute 2011 (http://epi.3cdn.net/2a7ccb3e9e618f0bbc_3nm6idnax.pdf) 
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The second research question (Q2) addresses how income inequality was defined. 
Table 4 presents the various definitions offered for income inequality. The most 
commonly referenced definition of income inequality was that there was a gap between 
the rich and poor (170 mentions), though a significant portion of articles referenced the 
fact that the gap was widening (148 mentions), suggesting that the fact that income 
inequality is growing is part of the way the issue is framed (Q2a). However, declining 
mobility (14 mentions) and the disappearing middle class (7 mentions) were not 
significant elements of how inequality was framed (Q2b).  
 
Table 4. Definition of Problem  
Definition                          2006          2007          2008        2009      2010         N 
Gap between rich and 
poor 
54 45 39 12 20 170 
Gap is widening 46 40 39 7 16 148 
Declining mobility 6 4 0 0 4 14 
Middle class 
disappearing 
3 3 1 0 0 7 
Other  3 3 2 0 0 8 
Not defined 18 18 10 4 12 62 
 
 
 
Next, I examined how causal responsibility was framed in the articles (Q3). Table 
5 lists the various casual interpretations frames mentioned in the sample. I found that 
neoliberal frames were most frequently used when discussing the cause of growing 
inequality (230 mentions), while liberal frames were used nearly as often (210 mentions). 
Fate was rarely as a causal frame (10 mentions), while many of the frames (127 
mentions) were not directly interpreted as either liberal or neoliberal. These ambiguous 
frames most frequently referred to immigration and education as sources of income 
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inequality. Appendix B includes a full list of how each frame was coded as either 
neoliberal, liberal, neither/both, or fate. Appendix D lists all causal interpretations by year. 
Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of neoliberal, liberal, and other causal interpretation 
frames mentioned within the articles. 
 
Table 5. Causal Interpretation Frames  
Cause 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 N 
Neoliberal 109 73 29 4 15 230 
Liberal 66 70 32 14 28 210 
Neither/Both 57 35 14 8 13 127 
Fate 5 3 1 0 1 10 
Cause is Complex 1 1 0 1 0 3 
None Suggested 14 17 20 7 15 73 
Note: The number of times causes for income inequality were mentioned at least once per 
article in The New York Times between 2006 and 2010. 
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Figure 4. Causal Interpretation Frames of Income Inequality in The New York Times, 2006 - 2010 
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Figure 5. Treatment Recommendation Frames for Income Inequality in The New York Times, 2006 - 2010 
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Table 6 lists the various treatment recommendation frames mentioned in the 
sample. In answer to my research question regarding how solutions for income inequality 
were framed (Q4), I found that neoliberal frames were most frequently used when 
discussing the solutions to income inequality (206 mentions), while liberal frames were 
used much less often (121 mentions). Many of the frames (118 mentions) were not 
directly interpreted as either liberal or neoliberal, the majority of which were ambiguous 
references to the benefits of education as a way to reduce income inequality or vague 
implications that the government should do something. Appendix B includes a full list of 
how each frame was coded as either neoliberal, liberal, neither/both, or fate. Appendix E 
lists all treatment recommendations by year. Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of 
neoliberal, liberal, and other treatment recommendation frames mentioned within the 
articles. 
 
Table 6. Treatment Recommendation Frames 
Solution 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 N 
Neoliberal 48 77 48 8 25 206 
Liberal 32 28 33 8 20 121 
Neither/Both 24 48 23 6 17 118 
None Suggested 26 13 14 3 11 67 
Note: The number of times different treatment recommendations for income inequality 
were mentioned at least once per article between 2006 and 2010. 
 
 
 To determine if there is evidence for a liberal or neoliberal hegemony in how 
income inequality is framed (Q5), I compared the number of liberal and neoliberal causes 
and solutions referenced from 2006 to 2010. Overall, there appears to be evidence for a 
neoliberal hegemony in how income inequality is framed as measured by the ratio of 
liberal (331) to neoliberal (436) causes and solutions mentioned over the course of the 
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five-year period. Fourteen percent more neoliberal than liberal frames are mentioned 
when addressing income inequality. Table 7 displays the total number of neoliberal and 
liberal causes and solutions mentioned at least once in each article to answer the question 
of hegemonic media framing of income inequality.  Figure 6 illustrates the percentage 
distribution of neoliberal and liberal frames over the five-year period. 
 
Table 7. Total Neoliberal and Liberal Frames 
Year Neoliberal 
Frames 
Liberal 
Frames 
N 
2006 157 98 255 
2007 150 98 248 
2008 77 65 142 
2009 12 22 34 
2010 40 48 88 
N 436 331 767 
Note: Total number of causal interpretations and treatment recommendations, found at 
least once per article, for neoliberal and liberal frames in The New York Times from 2006 
to 2010. 
 
 
Table 8 addresses what bias, if any, appears in the articles by analyzing what slant 
appears in each article (Q6). Table 8 shows that while the majority of articles did not 
contain a slant toward a particular cause, solution, or moral assumption, considerably 
more articles had a liberal slant than a conservative slant for cause, solution, and moral 
assumptions. Appendix F contains an example of an article coded for neoliberal cause, 
solution, and moral assumptions. Appendix G contains an example of an article coded for 
liberal liberal cause, solution, and moral assumptions. Appendix H contains an example 
of an article coded as having an unclear or neutral slant toward cause, solution, and moral 
assumptions regarding income inequality. Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of articles 
containing either a neoliberal, liberal, or neutral slant. 
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Table 8. Articles Coded for Neoliberal, Liberal, or Neutral Slant 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 N 
Cause Neoliberal 
 
5 9 2 2 0 18 
 Liberal  
 
18 16 10 6 7 57 
 None/Not Clear 49 39 39 8 25 160 
Solution Neoliberal 
 
5 7 2 1 1 16 
 Liberal  
 
19 19 15 7 11 71 
 None/Not Clear 48 38 34 8 20 148 
Moral 
Assumption 
Neoliberal 
 
3 7 5 1 2 18 
 Liberal  
 
19 19 13 6 10 67 
 None/Not Clear 50 38 33 9 20 150 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of Neoliberal and Liberal Frames in The New York Times, 2006 - 
2010  
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Figure 7. Percentage of Articles with a Neoliberal, Liberal, or Neutral Slant in The New York Times, 2006 - 2010
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 	  
Discounting Mirror Theory 
 
 My first research question asked if the coverage of income inequality between 
2006 and 2010 accurately reflected the real life increase in income inequality over that 
same time period. This question is important because most individuals rely on media 
representations of issues, particularly economic issues, to make sense of complex 
information that may not otherwise be readily available to them (Erbring, et al., 1980; 
Fogarty, 2005). In addition, the amount of news exposure a particular issue receives has a 
strong impact on what individuals believe are the most important social and political 
issues (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990; Erbring, et al., 1980; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; 
McLeod, et al., 1974; Shaw & McCombs, 1997).  
However, similar to findings related to the coverage of the obesity epidemic, 
avian flu risks, child-care availability, and political protests, this study found that there 
was little support for the mirror theory (the supposition that coverage in the media 
accurately reflects reality) as it relates to growing income inequality (Abeysinghe & 
White, 2010; Albanese, et al., 2010; Myers & Caniglia, 2004; Saguy & Almeling, 2008; 
Shoemaker & Mayfield, 1984). While income inequality continued to grow over the five-
year period analyzed by the study, coverage actually declined in all but one year. This 
fact seems particularly remarkable given that previous studies have found the media 
disproportionately reports negative economic news – and a rise in income inequality is 
certainly bad news (Fogarty, 2005).  
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Missing Frames, Social Mobility, and Cultural Hegemony 
 
 Because the media cannot be relied upon to provide audiences with an exact 
picture of reality, it is necessary to think critically about what, exactly, the media does 
provide audiences. Cultural hegemony, or the penetration of elite ideology into the 
common sense and everyday practices of subordinate classes, creates “spontaneous” 
consent to the structural inequalities within society (Gramsci, 1971). This theory suggests 
that the media will portray economic and social issues in ways that ideologically justify 
the current economic system.  
Media scholars that posit media coverage is influenced by elite journalist bias, 
corporate interests, dependence on advertising revenue, and/or newsgathering routines 
that privilege powerful government, political, and business sources, all note that the 
media serves to promote the interests of economic and political elites under the guise of 
objectivity, while deliberately conflating the interests of the elites with those of workers 
and others outside the elite class (Bagdikian, 1990; Bell & Entman, 2011; Gans, 1979; 
Gitlin, 1980; Kollmeyer, 2004). In this way, the news acts as propaganda that 
manufactures consent for the current economic system (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; 
Parenti, 1993). One of the most powerful ways this occurs is through the media’s “intense 
regulatory power” to “restrict serious, ‘responsible’ consideration to a limited range of 
topics and approaches” (Peet, 2002, p. 57).  
It is vital, therefore, to look, not just for the range of topics and approaches 
included in how an issue is framed, but to look for what is left out of the frame as well. 
This study found that while definitions of income inequality included a growing gap 
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between the wealthy and poor, virtually no mention is made of the fact that social 
mobility in America is virtually at a standstill, that the middle class is shrinking, or that 
America has one of the lowest rates of social mobility of all developed nations, second 
only to the United Kingdom (Garfinkel, et al., 2010; Hertz, 2006; Solon, 2002). This gap 
in coverage is particularly meaningful when considering that the single best predictor of 
Americans’ attitudes toward income inequality is their perceptions of the potential for 
mobility (McCall, 2005). Those who feel that America does not offer a good chance to 
improve their economic situations are far more likely to object to income inequality than 
those who buy into the Horatio Alger myth. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that 
the media is systematically reinforcing elite ideology – income inequality is acceptable 
because if an individual works hard enough, he or she will make it to the top of the 
inverted pyramid (Hochschild, 1995) – by leaving out the single most potentially 
subversive bit of information: most Americans will never personally benefit from the 
current economic system.  
Bias, Framing, and Cultural Hegemony 
 
 Contrary to media theories that suggest elite, fiscally conservative journalists or 
avaricious media corporations will bias how financial issues are portrayed in the media, 
this study found that more than half the time there was no discernable bias in how the 
causes, solutions, and underlying moral assumptions were framed when addressing 
income inequality (Bagdikian, 1990; Croteau, 1998; Croteau & Hoynes, 2001; Kollmeyer, 
2004). This finding is in line with other studies that suggest mainstream media (such as 
The New York Times) tends to be more balanced than left or right leaning outlets (Covert 
& Wasburn, 2007; Kim, et al., 2010). While scholars who believe liberal journalists’ bias 
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tends to leak onto the page might point out that liberal slant is represented more than 
twice as often as neoliberal slant, neutral articles far outweigh them both; if we are 
looking for patterns of slant to determine bias, the most we can say is that there is a slight 
liberal bias in framing income inequality in The New York Times (Entman, 2007; 
Goldberg, 2002).  
 When looking at framing and agenda setting effects, it is crucial to remember that 
the media tells us what to think, not through direct persuasion, but by telling us what to 
think about (Anastasio, et al., 1999; Entman, 1989). While patterns of slant that result in 
bias can be interpreted as a fairly direct attempt to shape an audience’s opinions, framing 
and agenda setting can be much more subtle. Framing and agenda setting make certain 
definitions, casual interpretations, treatment recommendations, and moral assumptions 
salient in our minds, while narrowing our focus to exclude ideas outside of the frames 
(Entman, 1993; McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). The power inherent in framing and agenda 
setting make them ideal tools for promoting cultural hegemony, since cultural hegemony 
relies on subtle but ubiquitous modes of persuasion rather than direct persuasion or 
coercion (Entman, 1989; Gramsci, 1971). 
 Therefore, it is interesting to note that while there was a slight liberal bias in how 
income inequality was framed in The New York Times, there was a notable difference in 
how frequently neoliberal frames and liberal frames were included in the discourse. Both 
causal interpretations and treatment recommendations had more neoliberal than liberal 
frames mentioned, while treatment recommendations had almost twice the number of 
neoliberal than liberal mentions. Overall, neoliberal frames were utilized 14% more than 
liberal frames. One of the questions guiding this study asks: Is there evidence for a liberal 
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or neoliberal hegemony in how income inequality is framed? If framing renders specific 
information more salient to audiences while excluding alternative ideas and 
interpretations, then the predominance of neoliberal frames regarding income inequality – 
in particular treatment recommendations for income inequality - suggests that there is a 
neoliberal hegemonic discourse in The New York Times from 2006 to 2010. 
Limitations and Further Research 
 
It is important to note that this study only analyzes how The New York Times 
frames inequality; other news media should be examined before generalizing these 
findings to all American media. In preparing the codebook for this study, articles from 
The Washington Post were used to test the coding scheme. While The New York Times 
initially appears to have a small liberal bias, the Post had a decidedly neoliberal bent; the 
issue of slant and bias should be analyzed further using a wide variety of media sources. 
In coding and categorizing the data, I had particular difficulty in teasing out the 
nuances of education as a causal interpretation and treatment recommendation for income 
inequality. While on one hand, education can be seen as a neoliberal cause (individuals 
don’t stay in school or work hard enough to get a higher degree), it can also be seen as a 
liberal cause for inequality (structural failures such as unequal access to quality 
education). As a solution, education can be either neoliberal (individuals should work 
hard to attain the education they need to succeed) or liberal (improving educational 
opportunities and quality for everyone). However, quite frequently education was used as 
a blanket explanation and cure-all for income inequality. Further research should focus 
on the way education is framed, or perhaps glossed over, in addressing income inequality.    
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Finally, further research should also be done to connect the ideas of framing, 
agenda setting, slant, bias, and cultural hegemony. What is more predictive of a media 
source’s influence over its audience – bias that attempts to sway an audience or the 
frequency with which specific frames are brought to an audience’s attention? 
Conclusion 
 
 The negative effects of income inequality are well documented. Nations with 
higher levels of inequality have higher infant mortality rates, shorter life expectancies, 
and greater negative health outcomes for all income groups (Garfinkel, et al., 2010; van 
der Hoeven, 2010). High levels of inequality also lead to government corruption and 
exploitation of workers (Sakamoto & Kim, 2010; You & Khagram, 2005). And when 
income inequality is extreme, social mobility is reduced, limiting the opportunities and 
fundamental freedoms so many rely on to achieve the “American Dream” (Hertz, 2006).   
Given these consequences, it is in the best interests of a nation to reduce 
inequality. Evidence suggests that a large public sector and the resulting welfare state 
generosity is associated with reduced income inequality (Gustafsson & Johansson, 1999; 
Moller, Huber, Stephens, Bradley, & Nielson, 2003). Lee, Nelson, and Alderson (2007) 
find that when governments have smaller welfare states, globalization leads to higher 
inequality, but that when there is a large public sector the effects on inequality are either 
attenuated or negative. Research also shows that left government has a negative effect on 
wage inequality due to the emphasis on minimum wages and active market policies 
(Moller, et al., 2003; Pontusson, Rueda, & Way, 2002; Rueda & Pontusson, 2000). In 
addition, low inequality is found when a large proportion of the labor force belongs to a 
trade union and when bargaining is centralized (Alderson & Nielson, 2002; Gustafsson & 
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Johansson, 1999; Moller, et al., 2003; Wallerstein, 1990). Finally, there is little empirical 
evidence that generous social policy discourages work effort and reduces labor supply 
(Atkinson & Mogensen, 1993).   
However, the new neoliberal cultural hegemony scorns such liberal initiatives as 
fiscally irresponsible and morally distasteful. According to Harvey (2005), neoliberalism 
is a “political program” designed to advance the interests of the wealthy elite, while 
exploiting the middle and working classes. Thus, when the news media shows evidence 
of framing income inequality in neoliberal terms that reinforce neoliberal cultural 
hegemony, there is reason to be concerned. While neoliberalism and liberalism can be 
seen as competing cultural hegemonic discourses, it can only be concluded that more 
effort must be put into including liberal frames in the media if real and lasting solutions 
to income inequality are to become part of the “every day common sense” beliefs of the 
American people.    
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APPENDIX A 
CODE BOOK 
Article # 
Date 
 
Play 
Day of week, Section, Desk, Page, Number of Words 
 
Focus 
1. Primary- article is about inequality 
2. Secondary- inequality is a parallel issue, a cause, or effect of the main 
focus 
3. Tertiary – mentioned in passing, not fully addressed 
       8.   Letter to the editor, review of book, article, etc. STOP HERE 
       9.   Other – not related to the issue at had (bio, history, etc.)  STOP HERE 
 
Problem Definition 
How is the problem defined? 
1. Gap between rich and poor 
2. Gap is widening 
3. Social mobility reduced/eliminated 
4. Middle class disappearing 
5. Other 
6. Not defined 
 
Causal Interpretation 
Who/what is causing the problem? 
1. Individual Causes 
20. Lazy/lack motivation/lack talent/lack discipline 
21. Lack education 
22. Broken family 
23. Disability 
24. Make bad decisions (take on too much debt, don’t save, don’t plan) 
25. Drug abuse/criminal activity 
26. Abuse/depend on social programs 
27. Highly motivated/work hard 
28. Exceptional talent 
29. Make good decisions  
30. Comes from a good family 
31. Quality educational attainment 
00. Other 
 
2. Societal Causes 
32. Culture of poverty 
33. Discrimination/racism 
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34. Changing demographics of region/nation 
35. Immigration 
36. Changing societal norms (inequality more acceptable) 
00. Other 
 
3. Political Causes 
36. Taxes burden wealthy/business or unfairly benefit middle class/poor 
37. Taxes burden middle class/poor or unfairly benefit wealthy/business 
38. Welfare/social programs create dependency 
39. Welfare/social programs are insufficient 
40. Education policies 
41. Political favors or advantages 
42. Economic/business regulation - too much 
43. Economic/business regulation - not enough 
44. Health care policy inadequate 
45. Right wing/elite conspiracy 
46. Left wing conspiracy/class warfare 
00. Other 
 
4. Economic/Business Causes 
45. Globalization 
46. Maximizing profits 
47. General greed (excessive compensation, etc.) 
48. Reckless behavior of business (poor investments, wonton risk taking) 
49. Abusive behavior of business (lending practices, fraud) 
50. Rise in unemployment 
51. Slow job growth 
52. Technology eliminating jobs 
53. Unions demand too much 
54. Unions declining in power 
55. Stagnating wages 
56. Inflation 
00. Other 
 
5. Fatalistic Causes 
57. Luck 
58. God’s will 
00. Other 
 
6. Cause is complex (without further discussion)/ too complex to explain 
 
7. No cause suggested 
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Treatment Recommendation 
How should the problem be solved? 
1. Problem should be solved by individual 
20. Education attainment 
21. Work harder 
22. Get/stay married/family planning 
23. Make better decisions 
24. Individual philanthropy 
    00.   Other 
 
2. Problem should be solved by society 
25. Community action 
26. Charity action 
    00.   Other 
 
3. Problem should be solved by government 
27. Tax cuts for the wealthy/business (or maintain cuts) 
28. Tax cuts for middle class/poor, progressive tax structure, increase 
for wealthy 
29. Create more jobs 
30. Reform government aid programs (more aid) 
31. Reform government aid programs (less aid/require more work) 
32. Privatize social security/reduce benefits/raise retirement age 
33. Protect/expand social security 
34. Raise minimum wage 
35. Boost economy (general) 
36. Improve school quality 
37. Improve access to higher education 
38. Control outsourcing, globalization, etc 
39. Protect union/worker rights 
40. Regulate business practices (misleading borrowers, risky 
investment, executive compensation, etc.) 
41. Health care reform 
    00.   Other 
 
4. Problem should be solved by businesses 
42. Limit outsourcing, globalization, etc 
43. Respect union/worker rights 
44. Regulate practices (stop misleading borrowers, risky 
investment, etc.) 
                           00. Other 
 
 
 
 
5. Problem can not be solved/ is inevitable 
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45. Result of capitalism 
46. Result of human nature/condition 
           00.   Other 
6. Problem should not be solved/is not a problem 
47. Does not really exist 
48. Is a good thing 
           00.   Other 
7. Solution not offered 
 
Slant 
A. Does the article contain a slant toward a specific cause of inequality? 
1. Conservative 
2. Liberal 
3. No slant/unclear 
 
B. Does the article contain a slant toward a specific solution? 
1. Conservative 
2. Liberal 
3. No slant/unclear 
 
C. Does the article contain a slant toward a specific moral assumption? 
1. Conservative 
2. Liberal 
3. No slant/unclear 
 
Definitions: 
 
Slant: Privileging one frame over another, either overtly or subtly by emphasizing the 
validity of one cause, moral assumption, or solution over another.   
 
Liberal causes: Structural, unequal opportunity, poor education opportunity, inheritance 
advantages, government deregulation of business, tax cuts for wealthy, declining power 
of unions, poor wages  
 
Liberal solutions: restructure tax code, limit inheritance through taxes, increase minimum 
wages, increase business regulation, empower unions, improve education opportunities 
 
Liberal moral assumptions: government should play a hand in eliminating inequality, 
capitalism should be moderated/regulated, not everyone has the same opportunities, 
extreme inequality is immoral, privileging equality 
 
Neoliberal causes: Individual attainment, individual failure, market efficiency, too much 
government intervention   
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Neoliberal solutions: Government should stay out of business, trickle down economics, 
deregulate business, cut taxes for all, eliminate union control, improve education 
attainment  
 
Neoliberal assumptions: pursuit of happiness paramount, keeping what one earns is fair, 
welfare corrupts, unregulated markets are ideal, everyone in America has the same 
opportunities, privileging capitalism 
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APPENDIX B 
NEOLIBERAL, LIBERAL, AND NEUTRAL FRAMES 
 
Neoliberal Frames 
 
Causal Interpretation 
Individual Causes 
Lazy/lack motivation/lack talent/lack discipline 
Broken family 
Make bad decisions (take on too much debt, don’t save, don’t plan) 
Drug abuse/criminal activity 
Abuse/depend on social programs 
Highly motivated/work hard 
Exceptional talent 
Make good decisions  
Comes from a good family 
Other 
 
Societal Causes 
Culture of poverty 
Other 
 
Political Causes 
Taxes burden wealthy/business or unfairly benefit middle class/poor 
Welfare/social programs create dependency 
Economic/business regulation - too much 
Left wing conspiracy/class warfare 
 
Economic/Business Causes 
Globalization 
Technology eliminating jobs 
Unions demand too much 
Stagnating wages 
Inflation 
 
Treatment Recommendation 
Problem should be solved by society 
Charity action 
          Other 
 
Problem should be solved by government 
Tax cuts for the wealthy/business (or maintain cuts) 
Reform government aid programs (less aid/require more work) 
Privatize social security/reduce benefits/raise retirement age 
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Problem should be solved by businesses 
Limit outsourcing, globalization, etc 
Respect union/worker rights 
Regulate practices (stop misleading borrowers, risky 
investment, etc.) 
                           Other 
 
Problem cannot be solved/ is inevitable 
Result of capitalism 
Result of human nature/condition 
                 Other 
 
Problem should not be solved/is not a problem 
Does not really exist 
Is a good thing 
                Other 
 
Liberal Frames 
 
Causal Interpretation 
Societal Causes 
Discrimination/racism 
Changing demographics of region/nation 
Changing societal norms (inequality more acceptable) 
Other 
 
Political Causes 
Taxes burden middle class/poor or unfairly benefit wealthy/business 
Welfare/social programs are insufficient 
Economic/business regulation - not enough 
Health care policy inadequate 
Right wing/elite conspiracy 
 
Economic/Business Causes 
Maximizing profits 
General greed (excessive compensation, etc.) 
Reckless behavior of business (poor investments, wonton risk taking) 
Abusive behavior of business (lending practices, fraud) 
Unions declining in power 
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Treatment Recommendation 
Problem should be solved by government 
Tax cuts for middle class/poor, progressive tax structure, increase for 
wealthy 
Create more jobs 
Reform government aid programs (more aid) 
Protect/expand social security 
Raise minimum wage 
Control outsourcing, globalization, etc 
Protect union/worker rights 
Regulate business practices (misleading borrowers, risky investment, 
executive compensation, etc.) 
Health care reform 
 
Both/Neither Frames 
Causal Interpretation 
Individual Causes 
Lack education 
Quality educational attainment 
 
Societal Causes 
Immigration 
Other 
 
Political Causes 
Education policies 
Political favors or advantages 
Other 
 
Economic/Business Causes 
Rise in unemployment 
Slow job growth 
Other 
 
 
Treatment Recommendation 
Problem should be solved by society 
Community action 
Other 
 
Problem should be solved by government 
Boost economy (general) 
Improve school quality 
Improve access to higher education 
Other 
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APPENDIX C 
 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 
 
Table 9. Inter-rater Reliability for Definitions of Income Inequality 
  Percent 
Agreement 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N 
Cases 
N 
Decisions 
Variable 1 (cols 
1 & 2) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 2 (cols 
3 & 4) 
80 24 6 30 60 
Variable 3 (cols 
5 & 6) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 4 (cols 
7 & 8) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 5 (cols 
9 & 10) 
80 24 6 30 60 
Variable 6 (cols 
11 & 12) 
100 30 0 30 60 
 
Table 10. Inter-rater Reliability for Causal Interpretations of Income Inequality 
  Percent 
Agreement 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N 
Cases 
N 
Decisions 
Variable 1 (cols 
1 & 2) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 2 (cols 
3 & 4) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 3 (cols 
5 & 6) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 4 (cols 
7 & 8) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 5 (cols 
9 & 10) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 6 (cols 
11 & 12) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 7 (cols 
13 & 14) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 8 (cols 
15 & 16) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 9 (cols 
17 & 18) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 10 
(cols 19 & 20) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 11 
(cols 21 & 22) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 12 93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
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(cols 23 & 24) 
Variable 13 
(cols 25 & 26) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 14 
(cols 27 & 28) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 15 
(cols 29 & 30) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 16 
(cols 31 & 32) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 17 
(cols 33 & 34) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 18 
(cols 35 & 36) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 19 
(cols 37 & 38) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 20 
(cols 39 & 40) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 21 
(cols 41 & 42) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 22 
(cols 43 & 44) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 23 
(cols 45 & 46) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 24 
(cols 47 & 48) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 25 
(cols 49 & 50) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 26 
(cols 51 & 52) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 27 
(cols 53 & 54) 
86.66666667 26 4 30 60 
Variable 28 
(cols 55 & 56) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 29 
(cols 57 & 58) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 30 
(cols 59 & 60) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 31 
(cols 61 & 62) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 32 
(cols 63 & 64) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 33 
(cols 65 & 66) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 34 
(cols 67 & 68) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
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Variable 35 
(cols 69 & 70) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 36 
(cols 71 & 72) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 37 
(cols 73 & 74) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 38 
(cols 75 & 76) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 39 
(cols 77 & 78) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 40 
(cols 79 & 80) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 41 
(cols 81 & 82) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 42 
(cols 83 & 84) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 43 
(cols 85 & 86) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 44 
(cols 87 & 88) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 45 
(cols 89 & 90) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 46 
(cols 91 & 92) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 47 
(cols 93 & 94) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 48 
(cols 95 & 96) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 49 
(cols 97 & 98) 
86.66666667 26 4 30 60 
 
 
Table 11. Inter-rater Reliability for Treatment Recommendations for Income Inequality 
  Percent 
Agreement 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N 
Cases 
N 
Decisions 
Variable 1 (cols 
1 & 2) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 2 (cols 
3 & 4) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 3 (cols 
5 & 6) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 4 (cols 
7 & 8) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 5 (cols 
9 & 10) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 6 (cols 100 30 0 30 60 
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11 & 12) 
Variable 7 (cols 
13 & 14) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 8 (cols 
15 & 16) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 9 (cols 
17 & 18) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 10 
(cols 19 & 20) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 11 
(cols 21 & 22) 
86.66666667 26 4 30 60 
Variable 12 
(cols 23 & 24) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 13 
(cols 25 & 26) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
Variable 14 
(cols 27 & 28) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 15 
(cols 29 & 30) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 16 
(cols 31 & 32) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 17 
(cols 33 & 34) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 18 
(cols 35 & 36) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 19 
(cols 37 & 38) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 20 
(cols 39 & 40) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 21 
(cols 41 & 42) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 22 
(cols 43 & 44) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 23 
(cols 45 & 46) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 24 
(cols 47 & 48) 
90 27 3 30 60 
Variable 25 
(cols 49 & 50) 
90 27 3 30 60 
Variable 26 
(cols 51 & 52) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 27 
(cols 53 & 54) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 28 
(cols 55 & 56) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
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Variable 29 
(cols 57 & 58) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 30 
(cols 59 & 60) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 31 
(cols 61 & 62) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 32 
(cols 63 & 64) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 33 
(cols 65 & 66) 
96.66666667 29 1 30 60 
Variable 34 
(cols 67 & 68) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 35 
(cols 69 & 70) 
100 30 0 30 60 
Variable 36 
(cols 71 & 72) 
93.33333333 28 2 30 60 
 
 
Table 12. Inter-rater Reliability for Slant (Cause, Treatment, and Moral Assumptions) 
Variable 1 
(cols 1 & 2) 
83.33333333 25 5 30 60 
Variable 2  
(cols 3 & 4) 
86.66666667 26 4 30 60 
Variable 3  
(cols 5 & 6) 
86.66666667 26 4 30 60 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CAUSAL INTERPRETATIONS FRAMES BY YEAR 
 
 Year        
 2006    2007    
 Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Causes 
% of 
Total Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Causes 
% of 
Total 
Cause is complex 1 0.40% 33.30% 0.20% 1 0.50% 33.30% 0.20% 
No cause 
suggested 14 5.60% 19.20% 2.10% 17 8.50% 23.30% 2.60% 
Individual Other 6 2.40% 100.00% 0.90% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lazy/lack 
motivation/lack 
talent/lack 
discipline 5 2.00% 71.40% 0.80% 2 1.00% 28.60% 0.30% 
Lack education 13 5.20% 40.60% 2.00% 10 5.00% 31.20% 1.50% 
Broken family 2 0.80% 20.00% 0.30% 4 2.00% 40.00% 0.60% 
Disability 1 0.40% 100.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Make bad 
decisions 2 0.80% 50.00% 0.30% 2 1.00% 50.00% 0.30% 
Abuse/depend on 
social programs 1 0.40% 100.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Highly 
motivated/work 
hard 3 1.20% 33.30% 0.50% 6 3.00% 66.70% 0.90% 
Exceptional talent 2 0.80% 50.00% 0.30% 2 1.00% 50.00% 0.30% 
Make good 
decisions 2 0.80% 40.00% 0.30% 3 1.50% 60.00% 0.50% 
Comes from a 2 0.80% 33.30% 0.30% 2 1.00% 33.30% 0.30% 
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good family 
Quality 
educational 
attainment 15 6.00% 45.50% 2.30% 10 5.00% 30.30% 1.50% 
Societal Other 1 0.40% 50.00% 0.20% 1 0.50% 50.00% 0.20% 
Culture of poverty 2 0.80% 40.00% 0.30% 3 1.50% 60.00% 0.50% 
Changing 
demographics 
region/nation 7 2.80% 50.00% 1.10% 3 1.50% 21.40% 0.50% 
Immigration 10 4.00% 66.70% 1.50% 2 1.00% 13.30% 0.30% 
Changing societal 
norms 1 0.40% 16.70% 0.20% 4 2.00% 66.70% 0.60% 
Political Other 3 1.20% 27.30% 0.50% 2 1.00% 18.20% 0.30% 
Taxes burden 
wealthy/business 
or unfairly benefit 
middle class/poor 4 1.60% 50.00% 0.60% 4 2.00% 50.00% 0.60% 
Taxes burden 
middle class/poor 
or unfairly benefit 
wealthy/business 21 8.30% 32.80% 3.20% 21 10.60% 32.80% 3.20% 
Welfare/social 
programs create 
dependency 1 0.40% 25.00% 0.20% 3 1.50% 75.00% 0.50% 
Welfare/social 
programs are 
insufficient 3 1.20% 20.00% 0.50% 8 4.00% 53.30% 1.20% 
Education policies 2 0.80% 22.20% 0.30% 4 2.00% 44.40% 0.60% 
Political favors or 
advantages 6 2.40% 37.50% 0.90% 5 2.50% 31.20% 0.80% 
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Economic/business 
regulation - too 
much 1 0.40% 25.00% 0.20% 2 1.00% 50.00% 0.30% 
Economic/business 
regulation - not 
enough 6 2.40% 24.00% 0.90% 8 4.00% 32.00% 1.20% 
Health care policy 
inadequate 5 2.00% 45.50% 0.80% 4 2.00% 36.40% 0.60% 
Right wing/elite 
conspiracy 3 1.20% 42.90% 0.50% 2 1.00% 28.60% 0.30% 
Economic Other 8 3.20% 50.00% 1.20% 2 1.00% 12.50% 0.30% 
Globalization 15 6.00% 35.70% 2.30% 12 6.00% 28.60% 1.80% 
Maximizing profits 3 1.20% 50.00% 0.50% 2 1.00% 33.30% 0.30% 
General greed 
(excessive 
compensation, etc.) 4 1.60% 16.70% 0.60% 9 4.50% 37.50% 1.40% 
Reckless behavior 
of business 1 0.40% 16.70% 0.20% 1 0.50% 16.70% 0.20% 
Abusive behavior 
of business 3 1.20% 37.50% 0.50% 1 0.50% 12.50% 0.20% 
Rise in 
unemployment 4 1.60% 66.70% 0.60% 1 0.50% 16.70% 0.20% 
Slow job growth 3 1.20% 100.00% 0.50% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Technology 
eliminating jobs 14 5.60% 41.20% 2.10% 10 5.00% 29.40% 1.50% 
Unions demand 
too much 1 0.40% 100.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unions declining 
in power 9 3.60% 37.50% 1.40% 7 3.50% 29.20% 1.10% 
Stagnating wages 25 9.90% 58.10% 3.80% 9 4.50% 20.90% 1.40% 
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Inflation 13 5.20% 61.90% 2.00% 7 3.50% 33.30% 1.10% 
Luck 4 1.60% 44.40% 0.60% 3 1.50% 33.30% 0.50% 
 252   38.60% 199   30.50% 
 
 2008    2009    
 Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Causes 
% of 
Total Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Causes 
% of 
Total 
Cause is complex 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 2.90% 33.30% 0.20% 
No cause suggested 20 20.80% 27.40% 3.10% 7 20.60% 9.60% 1.10% 
Individual Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lazy/lack motivation/lack talent/lack 
discipline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lack education 4 4.20% 12.50% 0.60% 1 2.90% 3.10% 0.20% 
Broken family 2 2.10% 20.00% 0.30% 1 2.90% 10.00% 0.20% 
Disability 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Make bad decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Abuse/depend on social programs 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Highly motivated/work hard 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Exceptional talent 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Make good decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Comes from a good family 1 1.00% 16.70% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Quality educational attainment 3 3.10% 9.10% 0.50% 1 2.90% 3.00% 0.20% 
Societal Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Culture of poverty 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Changing demographics region/nation 3 3.10% 21.40% 0.50% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Immigration 2 2.10% 13.30% 0.30% 1 2.90% 6.70% 0.20% 
Changing societal norms 1 1.00% 16.70% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Political Other 3 3.10% 27.30% 0.50% 1 2.90% 9.10% 0.20% 
Taxes burden wealthy/business or 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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unfairly benefit middle class/poor 
Taxes burden middle class/poor or 
unfairly benefit wealthy/business 12 12.50% 18.80% 1.80% 5 14.70% 7.80% 0.80% 
Welfare/social programs create 
dependency 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Welfare/social programs are 
insufficient 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 2.90% 6.70% 0.20% 
Education policies 2 2.10% 22.20% 0.30% 1 2.90% 11.10% 0.20% 
Political favors or advantages 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3 8.80% 18.80% 0.50% 
Economic/business regulation - too 
much 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Economic/business regulation - not 
enough 2 2.10% 8.00% 0.30% 3 8.80% 12.00% 0.50% 
Health care policy inadequate 1 1.00% 9.10% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Right wing/elite conspiracy 1 1.00% 14.30% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Economic Other 3 3.10% 18.80% 0.50% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Globalization 10 10.40% 23.80% 1.50% 1 2.90% 2.40% 0.20% 
Maximizing profits 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
General greed (excessive compensation, 
etc.) 3 3.10% 12.50% 0.50% 3 8.80% 12.50% 0.50% 
Reckless behavior of business 2 2.10% 33.30% 0.30% 1 2.90% 16.70% 0.20% 
Abusive behavior of business 2 2.10% 25.00% 0.30% 1 2.90% 12.50% 0.20% 
Rise in unemployment 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Slow job growth 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Technology eliminating jobs 6 6.20% 17.60% 0.90% 1 2.90% 2.90% 0.20% 
Unions demand too much 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unions declining in power 5 5.20% 20.80% 0.80% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Stagnating wages 6 6.20% 14.00% 0.90% 1 2.90% 2.30% 0.20% 
Inflation 1 1.00% 4.80% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Luck 1 1.00% 11.10% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 96   14.70% 34   5.20% 
 
 2010      
 Count 
% 
within 
Year 
% within 
$Causes 
% of 
Total Count 
% of 
Total 
Cause is complex 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3 0.50% 
No cause suggested 15 20.80% 20.50% 2.30% 73 11.20% 
Individual Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6 0.90% 
Lazy/lack motivation/lack 
talent/lack discipline 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7 1.10% 
Lack education 4 5.60% 12.50% 0.60% 32 4.90% 
Broken family 1 1.40% 10.00% 0.20% 10 1.50% 
Disability 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Make bad decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 0.60% 
Abuse/depend on social 
programs 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Highly motivated/work hard 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9 1.40% 
Exceptional talent 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 0.60% 
Make good decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 0.80% 
Comes from a good family 1 1.40% 16.70% 0.20% 6 0.90% 
Quality educational attainment 4 5.60% 12.10% 0.60% 33 5.10% 
Societal Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 0.30% 
Culture of poverty 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 0.80% 
Changing demographics 
region/nation 1 1.40% 7.10% 0.20% 14 2.10% 
Immigration 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15 2.30% 
Changing societal norms 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6 0.90% 
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Political Other 2 2.80% 18.20% 0.30% 11 1.70% 
Taxes burden wealthy/business 
or unfairly benefit middle 
class/poor 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8 1.20% 
Taxes burden middle class/poor 
or unfairly benefit 
wealthy/business 5 6.90% 7.80% 0.80% 64 9.80% 
Welfare/social programs create 
dependency 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 0.60% 
Welfare/social programs are 
insufficient 3 4.20% 20.00% 0.50% 15 2.30% 
Education policies 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9 1.40% 
Political favors or advantages 2 2.80% 12.50% 0.30% 16 2.50% 
Economic/business regulation - 
too much 1 1.40% 25.00% 0.20% 4 0.60% 
Economic/business regulation - 
not enough 6 8.30% 24.00% 0.90% 25 3.80% 
Health care policy inadequate 1 1.40% 9.10% 0.20% 11 1.70% 
Right wing/elite conspiracy 1 1.40% 14.30% 0.20% 7 1.10% 
Economic Other 3 4.20% 18.80% 0.50% 16 2.50% 
Globalization 4 5.60% 9.50% 0.60% 42 6.40% 
Maximizing profits 1 1.40% 16.70% 0.20% 6 0.90% 
General greed (excessive 
compensation, etc.) 5 6.90% 20.80% 0.80% 24 3.70% 
Reckless behavior of business 1 1.40% 16.70% 0.20% 6 0.90% 
Abusive behavior of business 1 1.40% 12.50% 0.20% 8 1.20% 
Rise in unemployment 1 1.40% 16.70% 0.20% 6 0.90% 
Slow job growth 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3 0.50% 
Technology eliminating jobs 3 4.20% 8.80% 0.50% 34 5.20% 
Unions demand too much 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
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Unions declining in power 3 4.20% 12.50% 0.50% 24 3.70% 
Stagnating wages 2 2.80% 4.70% 0.30% 43 6.60% 
Inflation 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 21 3.20% 
Luck 1 1.40% 11.10% 0.20% 9 1.40% 
 72   11.00% 653 100.00% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	  
87	  
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
TREATMENT RECOMMENDATION FRAMES BY YEAR 
 
 Year        
 2006    2007    
 Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Solutions 
% of 
Total Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Solutions 
% of 
Total 
Solution Not Offered 26 20.00% 38.80% 5.10% 13 7.80% 19.40% 2.50% 
Individual Other 1 0.80% 50.00% 0.20% 1 0.60% 50.00% 0.20% 
Individual education attainment 3 2.30% 75.00% 0.60% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Work harder 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 1.20% 100.00% 0.40% 
Get/stay married/family planning 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.60% 100.00% 0.20% 
Make better decisions 1 0.80% 100.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Individual philanthropy 1 0.80% 25.00% 0.20% 1 0.60% 25.00% 0.20% 
Community action 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 1.20% 66.70% 0.40% 
Charity action 1 0.80% 100.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Government Other 14 10.80% 23.70% 2.70% 20 12.00% 33.90% 3.90% 
Tax cuts for wealthy/businesses 
(maintain cuts) 3 2.30% 9.10% 0.60% 14 8.40% 42.40% 2.70% 
Tax cuts for middle class, 
progressive taxes, increases for 
wealthy 17 13.10% 22.70% 3.30% 19 11.40% 25.30% 3.70% 
Create more jobs 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.60% 20.00% 0.20% 
Reform government aid programs 
(more aid) 6 4.60% 23.10% 1.20% 6 3.60% 23.10% 1.20% 
Reform government aid programs 1 0.80% 14.30% 0.20% 4 2.40% 57.10% 0.80% 
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(less aid/require more work) 
Privatize social security/reduce 
benefits/raise retirement age 1 0.80% 33.30% 0.20% 1 0.60% 33.30% 0.20% 
Protect/expand social security 2 1.50% 25.00% 0.40% 3 1.80% 37.50% 0.60% 
Raise minimum wage 9 6.90% 60.00% 1.80% 2 1.20% 13.30% 0.40% 
Boost economy 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 1.20% 50.00% 0.40% 
Improve school quality 7 5.40% 21.20% 1.40% 14 8.40% 42.40% 2.70% 
Improve access to higher education 3 2.30% 15.80% 0.60% 10 6.00% 52.60% 2.00% 
Control outsourcing, globalizaiton, 
etc. 5 3.80% 29.40% 1.00% 7 4.20% 41.20% 1.40% 
Protect union/worker rights 3 2.30% 25.00% 0.60% 3 1.80% 25.00% 0.60% 
Regulate business practices 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 2.40% 19.00% 0.80% 
Health care reform 5 3.80% 13.90% 1.00% 14 8.40% 38.90% 2.70% 
Business Other 3 2.30% 42.90% 0.60% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Regulate own practices 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Unsolvable Other 3 2.30% 60.00% 0.60% 2 1.20% 40.00% 0.40% 
Result of capitalism 3 2.30% 30.00% 0.60% 5 3.00% 50.00% 1.00% 
Result of human nature/condition 1 0.80% 25.00% 0.20% 3 1.80% 75.00% 0.60% 
Not a problem Other 2 1.50% 28.60% 0.40% 4 2.40% 57.10% 0.80% 
Does not really exist 6 4.60% 54.50% 1.20% 4 2.40% 36.40% 0.80% 
Is a good thing 3 2.30% 42.90% 0.60% 4 2.40% 57.10% 0.80% 
 130   25.40% 166   32.40% 
 
 2008    2009    
 Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Solutions 
% of 
Total Count 
% within 
Year 
% within 
$Solutions 
% of 
Total 
Solution Not Offered 14 11.90% 20.90% 2.70% 3 12.00% 4.50% 0.60% 
Individual Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Individual education attainment 1 0.80% 25.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Work harder 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Get/stay married/family planning 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Make better decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Individual philanthropy 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 4.00% 25.00% 0.20% 
Community action 1 0.80% 33.30% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Charity action 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Government Other 14 11.90% 23.70% 2.70% 3 12.00% 5.10% 0.60% 
Tax cuts for wealthy/businesses 
(maintain cuts) 9 7.60% 27.30% 1.80% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Tax cuts for middle class, 
progressive taxes, increases for 
wealthy 19 16.10% 25.30% 3.70% 7 28.00% 9.30% 1.40% 
Create more jobs 4 3.40% 80.00% 0.80% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Reform government aid programs 
(more aid) 6 5.10% 23.10% 1.20% 1 4.00% 3.80% 0.20% 
Reform government aid programs 
(less aid/require more work) 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Privatize social security/reduce 
benefits/raise retirement age 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Protect/expand social security 2 1.70% 25.00% 0.40% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Raise minimum wage 4 3.40% 26.70% 0.80% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Boost economy 1 0.80% 25.00% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Improve school quality 6 5.10% 18.20% 1.20% 1 4.00% 3.00% 0.20% 
Improve access to higher education 1 0.80% 5.30% 0.20% 2 8.00% 10.50% 0.40% 
Control outsourcing, globalizaiton, 
etc. 4 3.40% 23.50% 0.80% 1 4.00% 5.90% 0.20% 
Protect union/worker rights 5 4.20% 41.70% 1.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Regulate business practices 8 6.80% 38.10% 1.60% 3 12.00% 14.30% 0.60% 
Health care reform 12 10.20% 33.30% 2.30% 2 8.00% 5.60% 0.40% 
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Business Other 2 1.70% 28.60% 0.40% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Regulate own practices 1 0.80% 33.30% 0.20% 1 4.00% 33.30% 0.20% 
Unsolvable Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Result of capitalism 2 1.70% 20.00% 0.40% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Result of human nature/condition 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Not a problem Other 1 0.80% 14.30% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Does not really exist 1 0.80% 9.10% 0.20% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Is a good thing 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 118   23.00% 25   4.90% 
         
         
 
 2010      
 Count % within 
Year 
% within 
$Solutions 
% of 
Total 
Count % of 
Total 
Solution Not Offered 11 15.10% 16.40% 2.10% 67 13.10% 
Individual Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 0.40% 
Individual education attainment 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 0.80% 
Work harder 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2 0.40% 
Get/stay married/family planning 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Make better decisions 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Individual philanthropy 1 1.40% 25.00% 0.20% 4 0.80% 
Community action 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3 0.60% 
Charity action 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Government Other 8 11.00% 13.60% 1.60% 59 11.50% 
Tax cuts for wealthy/businesses (maintain cuts) 7 9.60% 21.20% 1.40% 33 6.40% 
Tax cuts for middle class, progressive taxes, increases 
for wealthy 
13 17.80% 17.30% 2.50% 75 14.60% 
Create more jobs 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 1.00% 
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Reform government aid programs (more aid) 7 9.60% 26.90% 1.40% 26 5.10% 
Reform government aid programs (less aid/require more 
work) 
2 2.70% 28.60% 0.40% 7 1.40% 
Privatize social security/reduce benefits/raise retirement 
age 
1 1.40% 33.30% 0.20% 3 0.60% 
Protect/expand social security 1 1.40% 12.50% 0.20% 8 1.60% 
Raise minimum wage 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15 2.90% 
Boost economy 1 1.40% 25.00% 0.20% 4 0.80% 
Improve school quality 5 6.80% 15.20% 1.00% 33 6.40% 
Improve access to higher education 3 4.10% 15.80% 0.60% 19 3.70% 
Control outsourcing, globalizaiton, etc. 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 17 3.30% 
Protect union/worker rights 1 1.40% 8.30% 0.20% 12 2.30% 
Regulate business practices 6 8.20% 28.60% 1.20% 21 4.10% 
Health care reform 3 4.10% 8.30% 0.60% 36 7.00% 
Business Other 2 2.70% 28.60% 0.40% 7 1.40% 
Regulate own practices 1 1.40% 33.30% 0.20% 3 0.60% 
Unsolvable Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 1.00% 
Result of capitalism 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10 2.00% 
Result of human nature/condition 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4 0.80% 
Not a problem Other 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7 1.40% 
Does not really exist 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11 2.10% 
Is a good thing 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7 1.40% 
 73   14.30% 512 100.00% 
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APPENDIX F 
 
EXAMPLE OF ARTICLE CODED FOR NEOLIBERAL SLANT 
 
The New York Times 
 
October 5, 2009 Monday   
The New York Times on the Web 
 
Inequality as Usual 
 
BYLINE: By ROSS DOUTHAT 
 
SECTION: Section ; Column 0; Editorial Desk; OP-ED COLUMNIST; Pg.  
 
LENGTH: 846 words 
 
Not long ago, liberals were insisting that income inequality was America's most serious 
economic problem. 
  Now there are more immediate crises: A 9.8 percent unemployment rate, a yawning 
budget deficit. But the inequality issue hasn't gone away.  
  The latest census figures show the gap between the wealthiest Americans and everybody 
else widening -- rather than shrinking, as some economists expected -- during the crash of 
2008. An August report from Bank of America/Merrill Lynch suggested that middle-
income Americans, buried in real-estate debt, will have to wait much longer than the rich 
to see their finances rebound.   
  This landscape will put liberalism to the test. Since Ronald Reagan was elected nearly 
30 years ago, Democratic politicians have promised that their program could reverse the 
steady post-1970s growth of income inequality without sacrificing America's economic 
dynamism.  
  But having promised win-win, they may deliver lose-lose. In the short run, Barack 
Obama could preside over an America that's more economically stagnant and more 
stratified. 
  There's only so much that politicians can do about broad socioeconomic trends. The rise 
of a more unequal America is a vexingly complicated issue, whose roots may wind too 
deep for public policy to reach. 
  Liberals, though, have spent decades telling a more simplistic story, in which 
conservatives bear all the blame for stagnating middle-class wages and skyrocketing 
upper-class wealth. So it's fair to say that if a period of Democratic dominance doesn't 
close the gap between the rich and the rest of us, it will represent a significant policy 
failure for contemporary liberalism. 
  It's also fair to point out some reasons failure is a likely outcome. 
	  	  
	  
93	  
  For one thing, the lazy liberal's cure for income inequality -- soaking the wealthy with 
higher tax rates and cutting taxes for everybody else -- simply isn't going to happen.  
  In part, this is because the Democrats have become as much the party of the rich as the 
Republicans, and parties rarely overtax their own contributors. (That's why the plan to 
pay for health-care reform with a ''surtax'' on high earners found so many skeptics within 
the Democratic caucus.) 
  But it's also because soaking the rich only makes a difference on the margins. The 
federal income tax is already quite progressive, and our corporate tax rate is one of the 
highest in the West. To really create a more egalitarian America, we have to address 
trends that run deeper than the tax code. But many of these are issues that the Democrats 
are either unwilling or ill equipped to tackle. 
  For instance, inequality is driven in part by low-skilled immigration: it nudges wages 
downward for native workers, and the immigrants themselves are taking longer to 
achieve upward mobility than earlier generations did.  
  But today's Democrats, bent on consolidating the Hispanic vote, aren't likely to seek a 
lower immigration rate, or a better-educated pool of immigrants. The kind of 
''comprehensive'' immigration reform that liberals support would probably increase low-
skilled migration to the United States. 
  Inequality is also driven by the collapse of the two-parent household, which 
disproportionately affects the poor and working class, depriving them of the social capital 
they need to rise.  
  But today's Democratic Party increasingly represents ''unmarried America'' -- the single, 
the childless, the divorced. This makes it an unlikely vehicle for policies that discriminate, 
whether through tax code or the welfare state, in favor of the traditional nuclear family. 
  Inequality is perpetuated by our failing education system -- and especially by the 
bloated cartel responsible for educating the nation's poorest children. (If you want to 
understand inequality in America, start with last spring's Los Angeles Times series on 
what it takes to fire a lousy teacher in the Angeleno school system.)  
  But today's Democrats, the heroic efforts of some liberals notwithstanding, remain the 
party of the education bureaucracy, resistant to all but the most incremental efforts to 
bring choice and competition to our public schools. 
  There is, however, one way that a Democrat majority can plausibly bring down 
inequality: Just let government keep growing.  
  This is the lesson of Western Europe, where the public sector is larger and the income 
distribution much more egalitarian. The European experience suggests that specific 
policy interventions -- the shape of the tax code, the design of the education system -- 
may matter less in the long run than the sheer size of the state. If you funnel enough of a 
nation's gross domestic product through a bureaucracy, the gap between the upper class 
and everybody else usually compresses. 
  But economic growth often compresses along with it. This is already the logic of our 
current fiscal trajectory: ever-larger government, and ever-slower growth. 
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  That combination could eventually create the more egalitarian America that Democrats 
have long promised to deliver. The question is whether Americans will thank them for it.  
 
URL: http://www.nytimes.com 
 
LOAD-DATE: October 5, 2009 
 
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
 
DOCUMENT-TYPE: Op-Ed 
 
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper 
 
 
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company 
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APPENDIX G 
 
EXAMPLE OF ARTICLE CODED FOR LIBERAL SLANT 
 
The New York Times 
 
June 11, 2007 Monday   
Late Edition - Final 
 
Economic Life After College 
 
SECTION: Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 18 
 
LENGTH: 404 words 
 
Commencement is a time for idealism.  
  But economic reality is lurking everywhere, and new college graduates are vulnerable to 
ambush. They have been told repeatedly that a college degree is an open sesame to the 
global economy. But that's not necessarily so, according to new research by two 
economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Frank Levy and Peter Temin.  
It is true that people with college degrees make more money than people without degrees. 
The gap has narrowed somewhat in recent years, which is disturbing. But the earning 
power of college graduates still far outpaces that of less-educated workers. 
  The bad news, though, is that a college degree does not ensure a bigger share of the 
economic pie for many graduates. In recent decades, Mr. Levy and Mr. Temin show, only 
college-educated women have seen their compensation grow in line with economywide 
gains in productivity. The earnings of male college graduates have failed to keep pace 
with productivity gains.  
  Instead, an outsized share of productivity growth, which expands the nation's total 
income, is going to Americans at the top of the income scale. In 2005, the latest year 
with available data, the top 1 percent of Americans -- whose average annual income was 
$1.1 million -- took in 21.8 percent of the nation's income, their largest share since 1929.  
  Administration officials, and other politicians and economists, often assert that income 
inequality reflects an education gap. But Mr. Levy and Mr. Temin show that in the case 
of men, the average bachelor's degree is not sufficient to catch the rising tide of the global 
economy. 
  They argue that the real reason inequality is worsening is the lack of strong policies and 
institutions that broadly distribute economic gains. In the past, for example, a more 
progressive income tax and unions fostered equality. Affirmative action has also helped 
and probably accounts, in part, for the pay growth of college-educated women. But such 
institutions have been eroding and new ones have not yet emerged. At the same time, 
corporate norms that restrained excessive executive pay have also eroded, making the 
income gap even greater.  
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  Mr. Levy and Mr. Temin conclude that only a reorientation of government policy can 
restore general prosperity. That's a challenge to the nation's leaders and today's graduates. 
America needs them to build the new institutions for a global economy.  
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Democrats, seeking to energize voters over economic issues in much the way that 
Republicans have rallied conservatives with efforts to ban same-sex marriage, have 
begun a broad campaign to raise the minimum wage and focus attention on income 
inequality. 
  The Democratic argument is straightforward: it has been more than eight years since 
Congress last raised the minimum wage, to $5.15 an hour, and inflation has reduced its 
real value to the lowest level in more than 20 years. At the same time, Democrats say, 
executive pay has risen to ever-higher levels and Congress has regularly approved pay 
raises for itself.  
 With midterm elections less than four months away, Democrats have begun state ballot 
initiatives to raise the minimum wage in more than a half-dozen states where Republicans 
are in danger of losing House or Senate seats. 
  The issue is playing a role in Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Arizona -- all states 
where Republican senators are fighting for survival. 
  Pressure is so high in Ohio that Senator Mike DeWine broke ranks with fellow 
Republicans last month and voted for a Democratic bill that would have raised the 
minimum wage to $7.15 an hour. The measure received 52 votes, a majority, but not the 
60 votes needed to prevent a filibuster. 
  Democratic leaders in Congress are closely coordinating their efforts in Washington 
with campaigns in critical races around the country. Democratic lawmakers say they will 
try to block what is normally an automatic pay increase for members of Congress until 
Republicans agree to raise the federal minimum wage.  
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  ''We are putting some skin in the game,'' said Representative Rahm Emanuel of Illinois, 
chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. ''We're saying that 
there will be no pay increases for Congress until there's an increase in the minimum wage. 
This separates us from Republicans.''  
  Last weekend, Mr. Emanuel held news conferences in five cities across upstate New 
York, with Democratic lawmakers and candidates signing pledges to oppose any increase 
in Congressional pay until the minimum wage is raised.  
  Republican lawmakers have repeatedly defeated increases in the minimum wage over 
the past eight years. Business groups, supported by many economists, have always fought 
such increases on the argument that setting wages above normal market levels will cause 
employers to cut back on hiring the very low-wage workers an increase would be 
intended to benefit. 
  ''The minimum wage raises the take-home pay for some people at the expense of 
others,'' said Kevin A. Hassett, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, a 
conservative policy group.  
  ''It is wrong to redistribute money from the worse-off workers to other low-income 
workers.'' 
  For the most part, Republicans have sought to avoid debates about the minimum wage 
and focus on the overall strength of the economy. They note that unemployment is down 
to 4.6 percent, that the nation has added about 5.4 million jobs in the last three years and 
that wages have been climbing this year. Though most economists are dubious about the 
benefits of a minimum wage, the evidence of a link between a higher minimum wage and 
higher unemployment is mixed.  
  The unemployment rate among teenagers, a big share of minimum-wage workers, has 
remained above 13 percent ever since 2000 even though the minimum wage has gone 
down in real terms, after adjusting for inflation. Unemployment among people 16 to 19 
has hovered around 15 percent this year. 
  Opponents of higher minimum wages contend that prosperity is best generated by 
stronger economic growth rather than by mandated wage levels. And while the minimum 
wage has lost about 20 percent of its buying power since the last increase, average hourly 
wages have done better.  
  According to the Economic Policy Institute, a left-of-center economic research group in 
Washington, ''real'' average hourly wages, adjusted for inflation, have edged up to $16.52 
in May of this year from $15.58 in 1997.  
  In general, hourly wages have climbed much more slowly than productivity. Largely as 
a result, corporate profits have increased rapidly over the past several years and account 
for an unusually big share of the nation's total gross domestic product. 
  Senate Democrats, at a news conference here on Wednesday, said the minimum wage 
was long overdue for an increase and had lagged far behind prices for gasoline, health 
care and college tuition. 
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  ''We cannot sit by while minimum-wage workers see the real value of their wages 
decline,'' said Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York. ''We need to do right by 
hard-working Americans and raise the minimum wage.'' 
  Mrs. Clinton, a potential presidential candidate in 2008, traveled through Ohio on 
Sunday and Monday and talked up the issue as she campaigned for Representative 
Sherrod Brown, who is trying to unseat Senator DeWine this fall. On Monday, she spoke 
specifically about the minimum wage before a crowd of community activists. 
  Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, head of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Committee, said: ''The average American thinks that the minimum wage ought to be 
raised, even if they are making more than the minimum wage. Far more importantly from 
a political viewpoint, it appeals to certain groups of people who don't usually turn out to 
vote.'' 
  Democratic strategists systematically looked for issues on which they could start 
statewide ballot initiatives that would increase voter turn-out among groups that were 
likely to vote Democratic. ''Minimum wage was at the top of the list,'' Mr. Schumer said. 
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